Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional
Volume 21

Number 1

Article 5

7-15-2019

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Its Impact in Indonesia
Fredy B.L. Tobing
Universitas Indonesia, fredyblt@yahoo.com

Erwin Indradjaja
Universitas Indonesia, brewoerwin@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International and Area Studies Commons,
International Relations Commons, Law Commons, and the Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Tobing, Fredy B.L. and Indradjaja, Erwin (2019) "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Its Impact in
Indonesia," Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional: Vol. 21 : No. 1 , Article 5.
DOI: 10.7454/global.v21i1.365
Available at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/global/vol21/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at UI Scholars
Hub. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional by an authorized editor of UI Scholars
Hub.

Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional Vol. 21 No. 1. Page 101-125.
© Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional 2019

DOI: 10.7454/global.v21i1.365
E-ISSN: 2579-8251

ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
AND ITS IMPACT IN INDONESIA
Fredy B. L. Tobing And Erwin Indradjaja
Department Of International Relations
Faculty Of Social And Political Sciences
Universitas Indonesia
Email: fredyblt@yahoo.com & brewoerwin@yahoo.com
Abstrak
Artikel ini menyajikan studi historis dan kualitatif mengenai kebangkitan Negara Islam Irak dan
Suriah (ISIS) sebagai kekuatan dalam politik internasional dan dampaknya terhadap dinamika
ancaman ekstremisme berkekerasan di Indonesia. Munculnya ISIS adalah titik balik dari gerakan
progresif menuju demokratisasi di dunia Arab yang tampak dalam "Musim Semi Arab," dan
pengaruhnya yang telah menyebar ke luar Suriah dan Irak mengancam keamanan regional dan
global. Seperti di negara-negara lain di dunia Islam, masyarakat dan politik Indonesia telah
terdampak secara signifikan oleh aktivitas ISIS. Selain menjelaskan asal usul ISIS dan
penyebaran ideologinya, artikel ini membahas tanggapan dari komunitas ekstrimis dan
mayoritas masyarakat Indonesia terhadap agenda ISIS. Artikel ini berpendapat bahwa
tanggapan-tanggapan yang saling bertentangan terutama mengenai gagasan apakah ISIS benarbenar memiliki kualitas sebagai negara yang fungsional. Peran organisasi massa Islam moderat
seperti Nahdlatul Ulama dan Muhammadiyah juga terbukti penting dalam menentang
penyebaran ideologi ISIS di Indonesia.

Kata kunci:
anti-terrorisme, Indonesia, Irak-Suriah, ISIS, Organisasi Islam.

Abstract
This paper presents a historical and qualitative study to examine the rise of the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a force in international politics and its impacts on the dynamics of violent
extremism threat in Indonesia. The rise of ISIS was a turning point from the nascent progressive
shift toward democratization in the Arab world represented by the “Arab Spring,” and its
influence has spread beyond Syria and Iraq to threaten regional and global security. Like in other
countries in the Islamic world, Indonesian society and politics have been significantly affected by
the activities of ISIS. In addition to describing the origin of ISIS and spread of its ideology, this
paper examines the responses from Indonesian extremist and mainstream community to ISIS’
agenda. It argues that the conflicting responses primarily revolves around the notion of whether
ISIS actually has qualities of a functional state. The role of moderate Islamic mass organisations
such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah has also proven to be important in resisting the
spread of ISIS’ ideology in Indonesia

Keywords:
anti-terrorism, Indonesia, Iraq-Syria, ISIS, Islamic organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 2019, a United States-backed alliance of Syrian fighters announced that the
jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had lost its last pocket of territory in
Syria, bringing a formal end to the “caliphate” it proclaimed in 2014. Despite the defeat,
however, the damage done by ISIS-inspired terror acts worldwide is considerable. For
Indonesia, ISIS presents another case of international developments becoming a driver of
domestic terrorism activities. Most of the intelligence, for example, associate the main
actors behind terrorism acts in Indonesia with external parties; for example, both Azhari
and Nurdin M. Top who masterminded major terrorist acts in 2000s were Malaysian by
nationality, while Umar A. Faruq who played a role in linking Indonesian jihadists and
Al-Qaeda is of Kuwaiti by nationality (Persis, 2006). However, the impact of external
entities on Indonesian terrorism is not limited to the injection of individual personalities,
since these parties bring with them ideologies such as Wahhabi, Salafi, and Shia, and
spread them throughout Indonesia to recruit and influence extremist actors. 1
Since ISIS ascended onto the global stage in April 2013, the organization has
spread its activities into many Islamic countries beyond its core territory, including
Indonesia (Muhammad, 2014).2 An Indonesian YouTube campaign exhorts people to
journey to the Sham (Syria and Iraq) and execute jihad (Muhammad, 2014),3 and a wide
array of propaganda tools has been employed to garner recruits and to socialize
noncombatants regarding ISIS (VOA Indonesia, 2014). According to The Pew Research
Center, approximately 10 million Indonesians have declared their support for ISIS
(Kompas, 2016), and an estimated 500 have sworn allegiance to the group (Liputan 6,
2015; Liputan 6, 2016). In contrast, the organization has been rejected by the two largest
Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (Assad,
2014), as well as groups such as Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah-Majelis Ulama Indonesia
(FUI-MUI), which issued a press-release statement against ISIS early in its global
campaign in 2014 (Ashrih, 2014). However, it was not until March 2015 that Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto declared, “We (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia)
neglect the existence of ISIS for it horrifies Islamic community. Through takfiri ideology,
they have easily kufr within Muslims.” (Trianita, 2014)
Part of ISIS’s attraction for many Indonesians is that it is an Islamic State or
Daulah Islamiyah, a political entity dedicated to the Islamic-based movement across the
globe. The organization’s appeal increased further when Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi
declared his intention to form ISIS as a Caliphate. Furthermore, as evinced by their
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continued occupation of key territories, ISIS’s triumph in the Iraqi and Syrian wars, as
well as its promise to oppose the tyrant minority in Syria, are characteristics that appeal
to the group’s supporters.4
This article examines the impact of ISIS in Indonesia. The aim of this study is
twofold: (1) to assess the origin of ISIS and spread of its ideology, (2) to examine the
responses from Indonesian extremist and mainstream community to the rise of ISIS.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Here, we offer several relevant concepts to analyze ISIS. The first important concept
underlying the ISIS framework is that of the state. ISIS is a literal translation of Daulah
Islamiyah fii Iraq wa Syam. Daulah originates from the term dal-alif-lam, which, as
constituted on its denomination, has the literal meaning of “gradually changing,” “seizing
chance,” “changing and rotating,” or “defending champion.” Other translations include
“circulating,” “consulting,” and “getting opportunity” (As-Sufi, 2015). From a political
perspective, Daulah corresponds to “dynasty,” “state,” “government,” and “kingdom.”
(Sufistik, 2015). Hence, Daulah Islamiyah can be literally inferred as an “Islamic State”
—a state which is governed by Islamic values and power.5
Besides land, government and citizen, sovereignty is another element related to
the concept of the state. Sovereignty is the highest authority ruling a territory; it represents
freedom from external authority and full power over its citizens and institutions (Frankel,
1979).
Islam has been critical in the development and appeal of ISIS. ISIS identifies itself
as a Caliphate in the original style of the 6 th century. The Caliphate, deriving from the
word “caliph,” is a form of leadership acknowledged by the Islamic community all over
the world. The Caliph has the responsibility of implementing Shari’ah law and
disseminating Islamic treatise to the society: often, the title is used interchangeably with
Imamah; both terms have the same meaning, and they are used within the Shahih Hadiths,
which are among the Kutub al-Sittah, the six canonical books of Sunni Islam. The
traditional aims of the Caliphate include: (1) creating a society in which religion
permeates every aspect of life; (2) manifesting Islamic-based justice, security and
prosperity in every fabric of society; and (3) developing Islam as a peaceful religion so
that the adherent achieve eternal bliss as promised in Al-Qur’an, surah Al-Saba’ verse
10.6
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Another significant element of the Islamic state is its military capability as an
organized armed group that performs a “continuous combat function.” (Watkin, 2010).
Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in Somalia preceded ISIS as examples of entities that defy
traditional definitions of statehood in exercising authority over a territory as an organized
armed group (Margulies, 2013); however, ISIS has exceeded the level of leadership
organization and infrastructure established by those more loosely coordinated radical
militants.
ISIS represents certain Islamic characteristics. Some consider the Sunni to be the
more purist of Islamic sects, since they follow Muhammad and his loyalist Abu Bakr’s
prophecies in their observance, while the Shia support and prioritize Ali bin Abi Thalib
over Muhammad’s loyalist (Tim Riset Majelis Tinggi Urusan Islam Mesir, 2015). In
Syria and Iraq, ISIS gained traction among minority populations by positioning
themselves as fellow Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Sunni) opposing domination by the
dominant Shia population. The Sunni sect is splintered further into sub-groups, including
the Wahhabi and Salafi, both of which aim to purify the interpretation of Shari’a law and
implement it in the manner of Muhammad and the Caliphate’s era (Ali, 2014).
However, ISIS diverges from predominant Sunni beliefs and identifies more with
Salafism, particularly Salafi-Jihadis (Assad, 2014). “Salafi” itself literally means
“something that has already preceded” (Tim Riset Majelis Tinggi Urusan Islam Mesir,
2015). It refers to the paradigm that seeks to preserve and uphold textual understandings
of Al Quran and Hadiths without attempting for esoteric interpretation of the texts or
ta’wil. This paradigm aims to understand Islam, through Al Quran and Hadiths, as it was
understood and implemented during the years of the Prophet Muhammad. The people
who uphold salafi, the salafs, are thus often called the predecessors. This paradigm
emerged as a movement to purify Islamic religious beliefs and practices. Jihad,
meanwhile, is often associated with juhdun, literally means “struggle”, and jahada, or “to
struggle”. Jihad has been then understood as efforts to seek truth through all-out struggle.
Salafi-Jihadism is often considered among the most extreme in Islam in terms of
interpreting Shari’a law on a daily basis. Consequently, Salafi-Jihadism often sparks
conflicts among Sunni followers.7
The preference for armed struggle as the instrument by Islamic organizations such
as ISIS and Al-Qaeda represents their certain interpretation of Islamic ideology. Ideology,
in addition to shaping the behavior, also determines the objectives that its followers aim
to achieve. For Salafi organizations like ISIS, these objectives involve defending God and
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religion from insults and deviations. These insults and deviations also include religious
practices that deviate from Shari’a as upheld during the ages of the salafs. Tolerance is
practiced only as long as it does not compromise Al Quran and Hadiths teachings.
Otherwise, it would be considered as insults. This view justifies any means deemed
necessary to achieve the objectives, including the use of force. The ultimate goal, as stated
before, is the establishment of a community that strictly uphold and implement Shari’a
law.

An Islamic State in Iraq and Syria?
The emergence of ISIS into global prominence began with Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi’s
declaration of ISIS as a worldwide Caliphate, which occurred in close association with
his forces driving Iraqi government forces out of key western cities, the capture of Mosul,
and the Sinjar massacre. Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi had been the leader of Islamic State in
Iraq (ISI), after troops of the United States killed its former emir Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi
and Minister of War Abu Ayyub Al-Masri in 2010 (Calrion Project, 2016). By its
historical formation, therefore, ISIS is a reform of the previous ISI, as is another
denomination, the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The Levant is a region
comprising southern Iraq—Diyala, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Salahudin, Anbar, and Nineva—
and northern Syria—Al Barakah, Al Kheir, Al Raqqah, Al Badiya, Al Halab / Aleppo,
Idlib, Hama, Damaskus, and the coast of Al Sahel. ISIS and ISIL are essentially branches
of the same organization that oversee the territories of Sham and Levant.8

Origins of ISIS
The roots of ISIS date back to 1999, when Abu Mushaab Al-Zarkawi, founder of Jamaat
Al Tauhid wa Jihad in Iraq first proposed the idea of Islamic state in Iraq as a vehicle to
overturn Jordanian authority and accomplish jihad in Afghanistan (Calrion Project, 2016).
In 2003, Zarkawi’s group became active in opposing the US invasion of Iraq, and he then
allied with Al-Qaeda, which was then led by Osama Bin Laden, in 2004. At that point,
Zarkawi’s group considered themselves a branch of Al-Qaeda based in the region
between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Iraq.
In 2006, Zarkawi created Majlis Shura Al-Mujahedin (MSM) as a special jihadist
force comprised of Sunni Muslim community, which merged his group with several other
Jihadist armed movements such as Al Qaudafi Iraq, Jaish ath Thaifa al-Mansoura,
Katbiyan Ansar al Tawhid was Sunnah, Saray al Jihad, Brigade al Ghuraba, and Brigade
105

Fredy B. L. Tobing And Erwin Indradjaja

al Ahhwal (Assad, 2014). Under the guidance of Al-Qaeda, the MSM established the
infrastructure needed to enforce Shari’a law within a country. Not long after the
establishment of MSM, the US Airforce killed Zarkawi.
Following Zarkawi’s death, Abu Ayyub and Abu Omar attempted to establish the
ISI in 2006 through taking over areas with its armed forces and implementing Shari’a law
in its territories, of which the most significant was the Sunni Islamic community in Anbar
province.9 However, they made limited progress, and the organization did not begin to
attract large numbers of supporters until Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi transformed ISI into
ISIS.
At the point that Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi rose as the leader of ISI in 2010, the
Shia government of Iraq, along with those of Iran and Lebanon, was engaged with
multiple radical Sunni groups in addition to ISI, such as Al-Qaeda, Jaysh al-Fatiheen,
Jund al-Sahaba, Katbiyan Ansar Al-Tawhid wal Sunnah, and Jeish al-Taiifa al-Mansoura.
In 2011, ISI, Jabhat Al-Nusra, and other armed organizations backed Sunni
opposition groups in their confrontation with the Syrian government; ISI was also
involved together with other Islamic armed group such as Jabhat Al-Nusra to topple
Bashar Al-Assad (Calrion Project, 2016). The involvement of ISI in the Syrian war led to
a significant expansion of Al-Baghdadi’s sphere of influence, since he was now engaged
in a struggle against not one but two Shia governments, in addition to Shia opposition
movements such as Fail Leb Tif Hizbullah, Kata'ib Hizbullah, Syrian Mujahidin
Revolutionist, and Syrian Liberation Force.
After two years of war in Syria, Al-Baghdadi announced the transformation of ISI
into ISIS on April 9th 2013. In his audio-taped speech, Al-Baghdadi sought support and
obedience from Muslim across the world, and many listeners responded sympathetically
and showed a willingness to join the movement (Muhammad, 2014). True to AlBaghdadi’s word, ISIS soon created an Islamic state based on Sunni law and SalafiJihadist beliefs.10 This alteration, complemented by now legendary acts of violence and
cruelty, was a double-edged sword for the group, both conferring legitimacy among
extremists and fomenting friction among other Sunni Muslims. To address these
divisions, Al-Baghdadi defined ISIS according to the more inclusive form of Caliphate
or Daulah Islamiyah. In line with traditional conceptualizations of this universal Islamic
state, the ISIS Caliphate purports to encompass not only Iraq and Syria, but also the entire
Sunni community in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries (Gerges, 2016).
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Fear and Ideology: Maintaining the Caliphate
One can identify several patterns in the approach of ISIS to establishing and maintaining
hegemony. The membership of ISIS was initially very limited, and the intensification of
the anti-US movement, which began during the invasion of Iraq, aided the group’s
recruitment efforts significantly. However, the group’s members and sympathizers have
expanded beyond the anti-US movement to include other Muslims who agree on the
establishment of Islamic Caliphate. These people are skeptical of the imperialism of Great
Britain and France, as well as the US, and they fondly reflect on the hey-day of Ottoman
Empire. At the initial number of approximately 6000 people, ISIS member is growing up
to 20.000 people (Muhammad, 2014).
ISIS has established a defined territory; however, the areas it has claimed are still
under the authority of Iraq and Syria, and ISIS lacks any de jure recognition for its
territory. Nonetheless, “citizens” within its claimed territory regard ISIS as their legal
government, and they are classified even as having ISIS nationality. Citizens in the
Islamic State are controlled rigorously through layers of coercion, which inculcates fear,
forces obedience and dampens the resistance of followers. 11 ISIS terrorizes by executing
its captives by guillotine and promoting such actions through mass media, and on a larger
scale, ISIS advocates the utilization of weapons of mass destruction to create an even
bigger scale of impact.
The supporters of ISIS also use ideology as a weapon to exacerbate differences
and recruit support for its armed conflicts, addressing its opposition as infidels because
of “the failure of implementing Sharia law or bid’ah.” (Assad, 2014). The goal of living
under a state based on Islamic values has helped to expand the territory of ISIS, as proven
by the annexation of northern Syria and certain areas of Iraq in 2013-2014 (Calrion
Project, 2016). Non-Muslim citizens have the choice between paying a hefty tax,
converting to Islam, or the death penalty, which has generated a vast refugee wave coming
from ISIS-controlled territory. Yazidi, Assiria, Ortodox, and Catholic Christians are
among the groups that have been forced to seek asylum (Muhammad, 2014).
ISIS established a special governing agency, Al-Idarooh Al-Islamiyah, to be
responsible for administration and public services in its territories (Calrion Project, 2016),
particularly necessities such as water, electricity, and infrastructure, which costs less for
citizens than for non-citizen residents. ISIS runs an efficient, professional infrastructure,
hiring qualified people in their respective fields to fill positions in various sectors. For
example, former Baath party members occupy bureaucratic positions and receive decent
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pay and ISIS hires professional physicians, teachers and school administrators to provide
health and educational services. On the other hand, extreme force is employed frequently
as a strategy to create fear within the citizens, and human rights violations are common
(Calrion Project, 2016). ISIS applies Shari’a law daily, and has created a law enforcement
body specifically for this purpose. Violations of law such as robbery or adultery are
dissuaded through inhumane punishments such as cutting off limbs or even the death
penalty.
In addition to taxes, ISIS earns revenues from illegal and violent activities. While
hostage taking is commonly touted as a major terrorist fund-raising activity, this measure
often fails (Assad, 2014), and ISIS relies more heavily on illegal oil trading, which is
among the most lucrative of ISIS’s endeavors, along with bank robberies and illegal
trading in ancient artifacts, as well as donations from powerful supporters (Calrion
Project, 2016). There have been multiple allegations that some of the Gulf countries,
including Saudi Arabia, are involved in funding ISIS to support its involvement in Syria,
where they seek greater regional influence to counter Iran (Assad, 2014). In addition to
salaries and other aspects of infrastructure, these funds help the group to purchase
weapons and other war-equipment on the black market. Furthermore, ISIS regularly
obtains weapons and other equipment by seizing them from the Iraqi forces and similar
opponents (Assad, 2014).
Since ISI’s establishment, the organization has striven to attract recruits. Their
numbers initially grew based on the propaganda spread by members formerly of the Iraqi
military service; however, the ISIS campaign has also spread through social media, and
thousands of people have joined the armed group voluntarily. Frictions have arisen
between ISIS and other Sunni groups because of its reputation for harshness and
intolerance, and Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria is one of the groups affected by the tension.
Different interpretations of Islamic Shari’a law are indicated as the primary reason for
conflicts between ISIS and other Sunni groups (Antara, 2016). The tensions between ISIS
and other jihadist groups in Syria have also shaped the dynamics of pro-ISIS movement
in Indonesia as the following section will explain.

RESEARCH METHOD
This paper presents a historical study and qualitative research method to examine the rise
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a force in international politics and its
impacts on the dynamics of violent extremism threat in Indonesia. Data collection
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technique are retrieved from secondary data resources including relevant articles, books
etc. By emphasizing historical study and qualitative research, we intend to seek the
importance of consequential progress of events. This would delineate how phenomenon
is shaped by various historical conjunctures.

DISCUSSION
ISIS in Indonesia
The Indonesian government perceives ISIS’s Islamic values as undermining Indonesian
unity and values as represented in the Pancasila. Djoko Suyanto, Coordinating Minister
of Politics, Law, and Human Rights, declared that the government “neglects and denies
the beliefs of ISIS recently growing in Indonesia for it contradicts with Pancasila ideology
and our unity as the Republic of Indonesia.” (Suara Islam, 2016). This policy is essentially
a continuation of the approach adopted during the Soekarno era, which employed harsh
tactics against Islamist militants, such as the group Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia
(DI/TII; Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia), which sought to establish the
Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia). With the defeat of DI/TII and the
execution of its leader Sekar Marijan Kartosuwiryo, that movement was abolished in
1962;12 however, many of its veterans started offshoot groups that remained active,
including Jemaah Islamiyah, and some non-violent religious groups continued to affiliate
themselves with the dismantled organization through the 1970s and 1980s. Radical
Islamist activities in the country appear to have been limited in the 1980s and 1990s;
however, the violence began intensifying in the early 2000s, and Indonesia’s first antiterrorism act was enacted under Megawati Soekarnoputri’s leadership (2001-2004) after
Jemaah Islamiyah’s suicide-bomb attack in Bali in October 2002. Anti-terrorism efforts
continued during the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, including the execution of Dr.
Azhari and Nurdin M. Top, among other assassinations.
The Indonesian government monitors the activities of ISIS in the country through
the National Counter-Terrorism Agency / Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme
(NCTA / BNPT), National Military, and Immigration Agency. Measures implemented to
prevent the influence of ISIS in Indonesia include tightening regulations for Indonesians
traveling to the Middle East, monitoring the organization’s spread on the news, and
enhancing operational intelligence. Related ministries such as the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Defence,
Ministry of Education and Culture cooperate on enhancing security and anticipating the
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spread of ISIS in Indonesia. Nonetheless, as of 2015, 400-500 people had traveled to
Syria, leaving from Poso, Central Sulawesi, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara,
and Southern Sulawesi (Liputan 6, 2015). As quoted from Main Secretary of NCTA,
General Mayor Abdul Rahman Kadir, “All areas are prone to ISIS. Whenever we are
ignorance, they sneak in.” (Liputan 6, 2015). According to NCTA, approximately 53
Indonesians who have joined ISIS are either dead or presumed dead as casualties of war
(Liputan 6, 2015).

The Impact of ISIS in Indonesia: Conflicting Responses
As history shows, external development has played a significant role in shaping the
dynamics of threat from violent extremist groups in Indonesia. The 1979 Iranian
Revolution, for instance, gave then a new thrust for the political Islamic movement in the
country. Moreover, the Soviet-Afghan War in 1980s attracted hundreds of Indonesian
mujahideen that sought battle experience and military skills to be employed at home. A
number of veterans from Afghanistan infamously took an active role in terror acts in
Indonesia in late 1990s and early 2000s. Thus as a Muslim majority country with a long
history of Islamic jihadist movement, Indonesia is a natural target for ISIS ideology. Not
everyone agrees with ISIS, fortunately, as many in Indonesians, not only from the
mainstream civil society groups but also from within the extremist community itself, have
voiced strong negative responses.

Pro-ISIS Response
It did not take long after the appearance of ISIS for responses to come from Indonesia.
The massive propaganda spread through social media had successfully gathered support
from Indonesian extremist circles. At first, the support from radical Islamist groups in
Indonesia were channeled primarily through the provision of material support such as
medical assistance. Throughout 2012 until 2014, groups such as Hilal Ahmar Society
Indonesia (HASI), the Jamaah Islamiyah’s humanitarian wing, as well as various Darul
Islam factions sent delegations to Syria, bringing in cash and medical assistance to the
Islamist resistance in a way apparently designed to open channels for more direct
participation in the fighting (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014a). Other
extremist organizations that raised donations for Syria included Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
(JAT) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict,
2014a).
110

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 21(1)

As the appeal of ISIS were spreading out, Indonesian jihadists started to actually
join the fight. As early as December 2013, around 50 Indonesians had gone to Syria to
join ISIS (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014a). The number kept growing that
in 2017, Indonesian authority recorded that 671 Indonesians had tried to go to Syria, 99
of them were children (CNN Indonesia, 2019). Indeed, the conflict in Syria has captured
the imagination of Indonesian extremists in a way no foreign war has before (Institute for
Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014b). For the first time, Indonesians are going overseas to
actually fight in the foreign war (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014b).
On July 6th 2014, following ISIS’s declaration as a Daulah Islamiyah, an
Indonesian group called Penegak Syariat Islam declared themselves as part of Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria at Islamic State University of Syarif Hidayatullah. 13 On the same
day, Forum Aktivis Syariah Islam declared its support for ISIS and made a vow to follow
Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi as their leader.14
One of the reasons why ISIS was so appealing to the extremist community in
Indonesia was that it appeared to fulfill the religious prophecies that forecasted the return
of caliphate in the greater Sham (Syria). The fact that ISIS actually controlled territory
and strictly applied Islamic law in those areas it controlled also convinced Indonesian
extremists that ISIS was just a state in name (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict,
2015). During a pro-ISIS demonstration on March 2014, Bahrum Syah, one of the earliest
Indonesian ISIS supporter, explained that:

We want everyone to understand that there is a far better option for the prosperity
of all Muslims. This is not an empty offer but a genuine one that Allah is offering,
a Muslim State. We have come to promote this state so that people will understand
that the State already exists. At the same time, we want to tell the State that we,
the Muslims of Indonesia, are with you, and that if you ask us to pledge allegiance,
we are ready to do so.” (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014b)

On April 2014, when announcing his allegiance to Al-Baghdadi, Aman
Abdurrahman called invited “all those committed to the purity of the faith in Indonesia
and all over the world to defend this State in any manner possible, whether by sending
personnel, contributing wealth, spreading true news about the State, its religious precepts
and its achievements, as well as exposing the conspiracies to undermine it through denials
and lies.”(Muhammad, 2016)
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Social media provides ISIS with the global reach to achieve its objectives,
particularly in recruiting members;15 however, the group commonly utilizes the mosque
as a means for socialization (BBC, 2016), and it recruits through seminars. For example,
a seminar called “Unveiling Caliph Al-Baghdadi” on December 7, 2014 at Kendal,
Central Java, which purported to oppose ISIS, was in fact unmasked as a recruitment
campaign that actually spread the organization’s values. The International Centre for
Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Nanyang Technological University
Singapore estimates that 19 Indonesian groups, including Mujahideen Indonesia Timur
(MIT), Mujahideen Indonesia Barat (MIB), and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), currently
support ISIS.16 In addition to recruiting individuals, ISIS has also engaged in outreach
with Indonesian religious and political groups, and there are currently 19 Islamic groups
in the country loyal to ISIS, including the MIT, MIB, and JAT. 17
Many adherents support ISIS because of its promised benefits to their economic
livelihood. According to Abdullah Mustafa Rahhal, a Syrian cleric residing in Turkey,
ISIS propaganda guarantees considerable pay to every individual participating in its
activities in Iraq and Syria.18 In addition to economic considerations, other reasons for
ISIS’s success include western skepticism, jihadist aspirations (Husain, 2014), and the
Islamic dream of a Caliphate overseeing the application of Islamic law.19

Anti-ISIS Responses
However, the rise of ISIS has also triggered resistence in Indonesia. Many groups reject
ISIS’ methods, if not its ideology. The tensions between ISIS and the al-Nusrah Front in
2013, for instance, have forced Indonesian jihadis to choose sides (Institute for Policy
Analysis of Conflict, 2014a). People such as Aman Abdurrahman and his followers has
been the strongest supporters of ISIS. Support for al-Nusra comes from people like
Muhammad Jibriel who runs the www.arrahmah.com that has been critical of ISIS’ takfiri
stance. There was also a brief period during which the tensions between ISIS and other
jihadi groups in Syria fueled the disagreeent between salafi and salafi jihadism followers
in Indonesia. The salafi groups, appaled at ISIS brutality, began to use the label khawarij
against ISIS and cited a hadith saying that at the end of the world, the khawarij would
side with Dajjal. The pro-ISIS groups, on the other hand, accused the salafis of trying to
obstruct the restoration of the caliphate in Syria (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict,
2014a).
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Prior to ISIS’ caliphate declaration, Indonesian jihadi community had split over
the doctrinal issue of wether security forces of an idolatrous state (ansharut thaghut)
should be condemned as kafir institutionally, or whether they should be judged as
individuals (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014b). Those who supported the
first stance was later known as takfir mu’ayyan group while the later takfir am. Aman
Abdurrahman was the primary proponent of takfir mu’ayyan. As the debate grew hotter,
each side declared members of the rival side kafir (Institute for Policy Analysis of
Conflict, 2014b).
Other organizations have rejected ISIS and its values. Even Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia, which shares ISIS’s ambition to establish a Caliphate, has aligned its stance
with those of other major groups (CNN Indonesia, 2016). NU and Muhammadiyah are
two major Islamic organizations that have strongly positioned themselves against ISIS.
(Santrinews, 2015; Detik, 2017). A NU leader, Said Aqil Siroj, went further, exhorting
the group’s followers to oppose ISIS (Assad, 2014): “ISIS is declined by Islamic leaders
across the world. Therefore, NU invites the society to go against ISIS.”
MUI and FUI also exhibit a robust stance toward ISIS. The leader of the MUI,
Din Syamsuddin, dismissed ISIS as being opposed to Islamic values, and on August 7,
2014, (FUI) MUI released a statement declaring that (Ashrih, 2016):
“1. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is a radical movement claiming to
be Islam in Iraq and Syria yet not upholding Islamic values—rahmatan
lil’ alamin (Islam is for all). Instead, ISIS is using a coercive approach
to innocent people, destroying holy places by Islam, and violating
nation state that Muslim has struggled for.
2. Islamic community in Indonesia rejects the very existence of ISIS
in Indonesia. It has the potential to disintegrate Muslim and Republic
of Indonesia based on Pancasila.”

Majelis Intelektual dan Ulama Indonesia (MIUMI) expressed a similar opinion in a 2015
declaration (Muttaqin, 2015):
“4. The ascension of ISIS leader into Caliph is not going through the
proper deliberation, neither the vague identity of Ahli Syura nor the
leader’s identity. Therefore, the ascension itself is not syar’i.
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5. There has been a refusal in authorizing the Caliph stated by Islamic
world-leader community as stated by Ittihad ‘Aalamy li ‘ulama al
Muslimin led by Syekh Dr Yusuf Qardhawi, Rabithah World Islamic
Ulama Association, Syekh Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Sulaiman Al
Muhaisini, Rabithah Ulama Syrian leader Syekh Usamah Rifa’I, and
Syekh Abdul Muhsin bin Al ‘Abbad.
6. Calling all Muslim not to join the sect without logical and responsible
fundamentals and to stay alert not to be provoked by the issues spread
by irresponsible parties trying to disintegrate Islam in Indonesia.
Bearing the good will and justice to fellow Muslim who are fighting for
dignity of Islam in Iraq, Syria, and other places as instructed in AlMaidah verse 8: “O you who have believed, be persistently standing
firm for Allah, witnesses in justice, and do not let the hatred of a people
prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness. And
fear Allah; indeed, Allah is Acquainted with what you do.”

The MUI is a non-governmental organization that gathers Muslim scholars to
deliberate and remain in contact to mobilize Ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic fraternity),
Ukhuwah Wathaniyah (national fraternity), and Ukhuwah Insaniyah (fraternity of
humankind), thus, protecting and keeping the ummah to achieve a harmonious, safe and
prosperous society in Indonesia (Assad, 2014). Hence, the views of the Chairman of the
MUI or MUI reflect the views of many Islamic groups in Indonesia, particularly those
composed of Sunni who adhere to Shafi’i beliefs.
The community of Islamic scholars in Indonesia has also rejected ISIS. In a joint
statement, Komarudin Hidayat and Azyumardi Azra, the Rector and Director of the
Universitas Indonesia post-graduate program, respectively, declared, “fundamentally we
have to condemn ISIS and sterilize Indonesia from its influence. ISIS and its ideology
will dismantle Indonesia and Islam.20 This view, shared by many scholars in Indonesia,
reflects the character of Islam in Indonesia that dominated with Shafi’i beliefs.
Besides the stance of the Indonesian government, many members of Islamic civil
society reject ISIS as an Islamic entity. The leader of Istiqlal Mosque stated that
“ISIS movement is not an Islamic movement, instead an external party
aspiring to split Islam into disunity. Therefore, ISIS did things that are
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against Islamic teaching whatsoever. Islam does not encourage killing
non-Muslim without proper reasoning, let alone killing the Muslim
community.” (Muhammad, 2016)

Many Indonesians believe the teachings of ISIS such as engaging in sexual
activity during jihad, forcing people to convert to Islam, evicting and executing innocent
people and opposing different opinions on Islam is antithetical to Islam and condemn
these activities.21 The group’s perceived arrogance has also contributed to negative
responses. The importance of a centralized Islamic Caliphate also appears to be accepted
less by the Islamic society in Indonesia. For instance, MIUMI asserted that the proposed
Caliphate system was erroneous, as evidenced by Abu Bakar Al-Bahgdadi’s appointment
as Caliph without deliberation among other Islamic leaders.22 According to MIUMI, ISIS
system of appointing the Caliph is not the proper way, such as the vague identity of Ahli
Syura who designates the Caliph or even the Caliph itself. Hence, the system itself is not
in accordance with the Shari’a law. According to Azyumardi Azra, NU and
Muhammadiyah would rather focus on discussing Indonesian national development
instead of religious nationalism (Muhammad, 2016).
ISIS has encountered stiff resistance from these Indonesian Islamic community
organizations, which perceive ISIS as being too rigid and fundamentalist in their
understanding of the principles and implementation of Islamic law, as well as their stance
in labeling those with divergent beliefs as infidels and heretics. 23 As Islamic “purists,”
ISIS does not accept groups with different understandings and will commonly attack
fellow Muslims on issues regarding religious beliefs and implementation, including those
from the same sect. In Indonesia, NU is included on ISIS’ “unfaithful” list, and based on
its modern approach to understanding Islam, Muhammadiyah is also subject to the
group’s disapprobation (Ali, 2014).
NU and Muhammadiyah have millions of members and are very influential in the
Indonesian Islamic society. According to Hasanuddin Ali, NU affiliates number
approximately 79.04 people, including 57.33 million members, while Muhammadiyah
claims some 22.9 affiliates, including 9.39 million members (Ali, 2017). NU influence is
strongest in Java, with 63.5 affiliates, including 49.52 million members, followed by
Sumatra (9.14 million affiliates and 3.8 million members) and Kalimantan (2.89 affiliates
and 1.98 members). In addition, the area of Bali, East and West Nusa Tenggara contains
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1.56 million adherents, including 740,000 members; Papua has 699 thousand members
among 923,000 affiliates; and Sulawesi has 1.47 affiliates and 588,000 members.
Muhammadiyah has a similar coverage area, with 13.43 million affiliates and 4.91
members in Java; 6.08 million affiliates and 3.38 members in Sumatra; and 1.23 million
affiliates (351,000 members) in Kalimantan; followed by Bali, West and East Nusa
Tenggara (823,000 affiliates, 411,000 members); Papua (593,000 affiliates, 132,000
members); and Sulawesi (294,000 affiliates, 196,000 members).
The attitudes of NU and Muhammadiyah toward ISIS are based largely on
doctrinal differences. These groups derive their strength from their enormous
memberships, and any external group offering information or ideology that differs from
the prevailing opinion of those organizations will be opposed and rejected. NU and
Muhammadiyah follow the beliefs attributed to Imam Shafii, whose adherents comprise
approximately 28% of the total number of Islamic worshipers in the world (Ali, 2017).
Shafii beliefs are entrenched in Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, and outside of Southeast Asia, adherents are
dispersed across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Egypt, Yemen and Somalia.
In contrast, ISIS’ existence in the Arabian Peninsula is associated with the
Wahhabi and the Salafi, who generally follow beliefs of Imam Ahmad bin Hambal.
Hambalists comprise a small minority of approximately 5% of all Muslims, and they are
especially dominant in the Arabian Peninsula, including Saudi Arabia, which is mostly
Wahhabi (Hambali) (Ali, 2017).24
Shafii and Hambali scholars generally advocate “mutual recognition of
differences and respect also tolerate for each other”;25 however, conflicts do arise between
followers. In essence, the beliefs of different views in certain matters in the teachings of
Islamic religion, actually located in a group named Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (Sunni).26
Therefore, it is a fact that the beliefs on the one hand are different but have the same basic
unity.
The attitudes of organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah are very important
in analyzing ISIS opportunities to influence the Islamic society in Indonesia. NU and
Muhammadiyah are strong institutions in the Indonesian state, and they have shown their
strength in conflict with their opponents.27 During the war of independence, NU and
Muhammadiyah fought against the Dutch alongside the Indonesia National Army /
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Similarly, when there was a conflict with the
Indonesian Communists Party / Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), NU and
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Muhammadiyah together with the TNI.28 NU has a political channel called the National
Awakening Party / Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). Although Muhammadiyah does
not have its own official political party, many members and sympathizers are part of the
National Mandate Party / Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN). In addition, many affiliates of
both groups are members of the United Development Party/Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan (PPP). All of these factors indicate a strong base for opposing ISIS among
Indonesian civil society.

CONCLUSION
As analyzed above, contention against ISIS in Indonesia derives not only from its status
as a state or organized armed group, but also in response to its notoriously inhumane
reputation, which allegedly correspond to the organization’s Islamic beliefs. ISIS is
engaged in conflicts with both governments and non-governing Islamic groups,
particularly among other Sunni in Iraq and Syria. ISIS holds its beliefs as exclusive from
other Islamic group; thus, the Salafi-Jihadis reject non-Salafis as infidels. In addition,
ISIS engages in conflicts with other purist groups, even when they share the same
intentions.
In Indonesia, preachers influence the existing Islamic groups with various
adaptations to local wisdom. This condition implies that ISIS is not compatible with the
Islamic movement in Indonesia, and it is likely that ISIS’s presence will result in
contention, particularly if ISIS behaves as it has in Syria or Iraq. ISIS beliefs are highly
likely to clash with the prevailing Islamic values in Indonesia, as evinced by the NU and
Muhammadiyah organizations. The contention would intensify as ISIS continues with its
erratic behavior and its practice of coercing adherence to Islam.
ISIS is likely to face strong contention from Indonesia’s government, which will
hinder its movements in the country. In spite of some earlier difficulties, the Indonesian
government’s efforts to combat radicalization have been consistent. Since the enactment
of the anti-terrorism act, the government’s stance on combating radical movements has
been clear, firm, and measurable. Therefore, ISIS will face a difficult time extending its
operations to the Indonesian society.
Furthermore, since the group has had to face opposition from other Sunnis in
addition to its main Shia adversaries, the presence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria has been
shrinking over the past two years. Due to its notoriety, many Gulf countries have
discontinued support for ISIS, which could reduce its power and popularity to the point
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that ISIS reverts to a typical organized armed group akin to Boko Haram or Al-Sabaab,
thus, crippling its influence within its territory and hindering its ability to target distant
countries such as Indonesia.
However, Indonesia must stay alert. Islamic radicalism may be limited; yet, it does
exist, and it is constantly growing. The physical presence of ISIS in the Middle East might
have been diminished, but the notion of establishing Daulah Islamiyah will linger. If
Indonesia were to end its commitment to religious tolerance, the number of Islamic
extremists would likely grow exponentially. The government needs to monitor people
returning from the Iraqi and Syrian war; however, it is also necessary to deal peacefully
and wisely with any people allegedly associated with extremist movements. Therefore,
the government should devote further effort toward deradicalization by addressing the
root problems of the disaffected. Empowering moderate Islam is another measure to
overcome radicalism. Engaging moderate Islam as the main Islamic power in Indonesia
could prove effective in socializing similar beliefs among the public. A powerful
moderate group could then assist Indonesia in preventing the spread of extremist beliefs,
even by as big a player as ISIS.
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NOTES:
1

For more information about the Wahabi and Salafi groups, see Muhammad H. Assad (2014), “ISIS

Organisasi Teroris yang Paling Mengerikan Abad Ini.” Jakarta: Zahira.; Also see, Reno Muhammad (2014),
ISIS mengungkap fakta terorisme berlabel Islam. Jakarta: Nora Book; and, As’ad Said Ali (2012), “Ideologi
Gerakan Pasca-Reformasi”. Jakarta: LP3ES. Information about Shiite in Indonesia, see Oki Setiana Dewi
(2016) “Syiah: dari Kemunculannya Hingga Perkembangannya di Indonesia,” Jurnal Studi Al-Qur’an:
Membangun Tradisi Berfikir Qur’ani, 12(2): 217-237
2

In his book, Reno said that April 17th was the declaration day of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

While Muhammad Haidar Assad said that the declaration day of ISIS was April 9 th (see Muhammad H.
Assad, loc.cit).
3

Reno quoted, Salim Mubarok Attamimi Al Indonesiy, which originally came from Pasuran (p. 61), as

stating, “Ikhwani Fillah (Islam Women), ‘Please Go, very soon to Syria’”. In his book (p. 62), Reno also
quoted the statement of Abu Muhammad Al Indonesiy (an alumni of Tandzim Jihad Aceh which was led
by Abu Roban), which quoted from Surat Al Taubah, Al Quran, “Say if it be that your fathers, your sons,
your brothers, your mates, or your kindred; the wealth that ye have gained; the commerce in which ye fear
a decline; or the dwellings in which ye delight-are dearer to you than Allah, or His Messenger, or the striving
in His Cause-Then wait until Allah brings about His decision: Allah guide not the rebellious” (verse 24)…”.
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“Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and your
persons, in the Cause of Allah. That is best for you, if ye (but) knew” (verse 41).
4

This statement is the opinion of M. Iqbal (Syria Islamic Leader in exile). See “Ini Penyebab Banyak Orang

Indonesia Ingin Gabung ISIS Menurut Ulama Suriah: M.Iqbal” retrieved May 31 st, 2015, from
http://news.detik.com/berita/2929891/ini-penyebab-banyak-orang-indonesia-ingin-gabung-isis-menurutulama-suriah.
5

See, Elena Pavlova (2007) “ Froam A Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah

According to PUPJI,” Syudies in Conflict & Terrorism 30: 783.
Theories on the state classify polities into categories based on their citizen-government relations and
citizens’ rights. Ideocracy is a state in which citizens feel threatened, act passively and willingly loyal to
the government. Democracy is a state in which citizen as an individual has equal power as the government
does. Aristocracy is a state in which citizen is differed by class –upper class as the government and lower
class as citizen. Monarchy is a state in which a group of citizen considered as a government and the rest is
being faithful to them. For more on the theory of state see Johan Kaspas Blunstchli (2000), The Theory of
the State, Ontario: Batoche Book, p. 278-284.
6

See “Apa Itu Khilafah?”, retrieved Januari 29th, 2016, from http://hizbut-tahir.or.id/2010/11/18/apa-itu-

khilafah/. Another definition stated, “Caliphate is a government structure that is organized based on Islamic
religion in which all the aspects about the governmental aspects are based on the Islamic religion.” Also
see, Ainul Rofiq al Amin (2012) Membongkar Proyek Khilafah Ala Hiszbut Tahrir di Indonesia,
Yogyakarta: LkiS Pelangi Aksara. “
7

For example, ISIS attacked Syrian Islamic Fighters or Syria Mujahidin from other Islamic Groups such

as Jabhat Al Nusra or JN (formal branch of Al Qaeda in Syria), Ahrarus Syam, Jabhah Al Islamiyah and
some other Syrian Islamic Armed Group. When attacking the Syrian Islamic Fighters (as Mujahidin), ISIS
also uses suicide bomb tactics. These actions had broken the concentration of all the Sunni (Ahlus Sunnah
wal Jamaah) fighters in their efforts to fight President Bassar Assad and the Russian Army who helped the
Assad regime. See, “Sejarah ISIS, Asal Mula dan Deklarasi Khalifah-Siapa”, retrieved January 31st, 2016,
from http://www.bebibums.com/2014/08/sejarah-isis-asal-mula-deklarasi.html.
Levant is the English name for Sham country (Syria now). See, “Sejarah ISIS asal mula & deklarasi

8

Khilafah - Siapa”, retrieved June 28th, 2015, from http://www.bebibums.com/2014/08/sejarah-isis-asalmula-deklarasi.html. Muhammad Siddiqi stated, “the Levant is an old term referring to countries of the
eastern Mediterranean.” However, some scholars include in it Cyprus and a small part of Turkey. However,
basically, throughout history, the Levant has meant Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. This means Jordan, the
West Bank (now under Israeli occupation) and Israel itself are part of the Levant,” see What is the Levant?,
retrieved June 28th, 2015, from http://www.dawn.com/news/1113209.
9

Although most of Iraqi Muslim follows Shia Islam, Sunni adherents dominate the desert of Anbar

province.
10

This changing attitude caused opposition from local tribes or original fighter group in Iraq as in Fallujah.

See, The Islamic State, Calrion Project.
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11

Information about the way ISIS force the people in Iraq or Syria, see book of Muhammad H. Assad,

2014. p. 159-164. compare with Special Report-’The Islamic State, p. 28-30, retrieved June 28th, 2015,
from http://www.calrionproject.org/
12

To get to know about the history and background of the DI/TII’s rebels in Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah,

Kalimantan Selatan, Aceh dan Sulawesi Selatan better, please see “Sejarah Lengkap dan Latar Belakang
Pemberontakan DI/TII di Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Kalimantan Selatan, Aceh, dan Sulawesi Selatan”,
retrieved January 26th, 2016, from http://www.dosenpendidikan.net/2016/06/sejarah-lengkap-dan-latarbelakang-pemberontakan-di-tii-di-jawa-barat-jawa-tengah-kalimantan-selatan-aceh-dan-sulawesiselatan.html. Also see, Kartosoewirjo (2011), “Mimpi Negara Islam”. Jakarta: Tempo.
13

In his book, Assad (2014) stated that a Syariah Islam Up Holder Group distribute pamphlets that

informed all Islam women to do ’jihad sex’ (Jihad sex means to serve sexual desire of some mujahiddins).
Haidar also pronounced the statement of Vice President for Student Affairs of State Islamic University in
Jakarta, that is: In that pamphlet it was stated that all ’ukhti’ (Islamic woman who apply for jihad sex) can
contact the ISIS Secretary in Indonesia at Fathullah Mosque in State Islamic University in Jakarta”.
14

According to Reno (2016), there is an image showing that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Founder of Jamaah

Ansharut Tauhid together with other detained jihadists supported the Islamic State); however, on
November 17, 2015, Ba'asyir argued that the problem of the Islamic State no longer exists and has ended.
15

See more explanation on this topic on “Jihad Selfie, Menguak Cara Baru Rekrut Teroris via Sosmed”,

retrieved February 1st, 2016, from http://citizen6.liputan6.com/ read/2582734/ jihad-selfie-menguak-carabaru-rekrut-teroris-via-socmed. In his book, AS Hikam stated some website that openly supported or
clandestinely supported ISIS, that is ‘http://al-mustaqbal, http://shoutussalam’, and ‘http://panjimas’.
16

According to Muhammad Haidar Assad, the leader of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir

confessed that he did not do baiat to the leader of ISIS although he once supported ISIS (see Muhammad
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